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BROKERAGE-WHEN IS IT PERMITTED UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT?
BASIL J. MEZINES *
Until the Supreme Court interpreted Section 2(c) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act' for the first time in 1960's famous FTC v. Henry
Brock & Co. case,' it was agreed that the statute absolutely prohibited
a seller from making, and a buyer from receiving, any payment for
brokerage, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, upon the sale
of goods.' Buyers and sellers based their defense on section 2(c)'s "ex-
cept for services rendered" clause. They attempted to demonstrate that
services were performed for persons other than their principal, thus
justifying the payment of brokerage, but the defense proved futile. For
all practical purposes the "services rendered" clause was read out of
the act.'
Many critics of section 2(c), including the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, advocated legislation
* A.B., George Washington University, 1945; LL.B., George Washington University,
1948; Member, District of Columbia and Maryland Bars. Trial Attorney, Bureau of
Restraint of Trade, Federal Trade Commission. The opinions expressed in this article
are the author's. They do not necessarily represent the view of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. While the author served as counsel supporting the complaint in most of the
recent FTC brokerage cases, a sincere effort has been made to present these cases
objectively.
1 Section 2(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a
commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount
in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where
such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by
whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
2 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
3 From the time of the enactment of the so-called brokerage amendment to the
Clayton Act until Broch, eight circuit courts of appeals had stated in forceful language
that the section bars the payment of brokerage, or other compensation in its place, from
a seller to a buyer upon the buyer's own purchases. See cases cited note 4 infra.
4 FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960); In Re
Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Independent Grocers Alliance Distrib. Co.
v. FTC, 203 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1953); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.
1945); Modern Mkting. Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Fitch v.
Kentucky-Tenn. Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943); Quality Bakers of
America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d
268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC,
106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC,
102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
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to correct what they believed to be the anticompetitive features of the
section. The legislative route was deemed best suited for their purposes
because "numerous appellate adjudications which affirm[ed] the Com-
mission's previous restrictive interpretations" made judicial reinterpre-
tation seemingly impossible to achieve.*
While the Broth decision was, on its face, a vindication of the
Commission's position in that case, some of the language contained in
the decision led commentators to question the viability of the earlier
courts of appeals decisions. Recent Federal Trade Commission cases
confirm that the Commission has, to some extent, felt obliged to review
previously unquestioned dogma in the light of Brock. Paradoxically,
later federal court decisions in treble damage actions have all but ig-
nored the questionable language in Broth and have apparently chosen
an approach to section 2(c) which is practically identical to pre-Broch
rulings.
This article shall review (1) the legislative aims in enacting the
statute, (2) the old cases, (3) the Brach decision, (4) the new cases,
and (5) the future of section 2(c).
I. THE LEGISLATIVE AIMS IN ENACTING THE STATUTE
•
In 1914 Congress enacted Section 2 of the original Clayton Act
in order to halt the large trusts from eliminating smaller competitors by
cutting prices in selected local areas.' By the 1930's, however, new and
more urgent problems called for corrective action. Both the pressure
of a depression economy on the small entrepreneur, and the phenomenal
rise of the large chain enterprises, whose purchasing power helped them
to extract preferential treatment from a large and small sellers, were
brought forcefully to Congress' attention by the FTC's "Final Report
on the Chain Store Investigation."'
Congress responded with the passage of the sometimes confusing,
obscurely worded and overly maligned Robinson-Patman Act. The
ostensible purpose of the act was to curb the use of buying power as a
means of compelling price favoritism.
5
 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Report 192, 193 (1955). See also Rowe, Price
Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 546 (1962) ; Adelman, The Consistency
of the Robinson -Patman Act, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 5-6 (1953); Oppenheim, Federal Anti-
trust Legislation: Guideposts to Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev.
1139, 1207 (1952). One author, writing about the section in 1959, stated:
Section 2(c) is undoubtedly the most ambiguous and faultily drafted section
of the act. Yet, surprisingly enough, it is the only section as to which no impor-
tant question of interpretation still remains unsettled.
Austin, Price Discrimination 106 (2d rev. ed. 1959).
6
 38 Stat. 730 (1940). See also Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 245-326
(1924), for a discussion of the original Clayton Act.
7 S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 -63 (1935).
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Section 2 (a),8 the heart of Robinson-Patman, prohibits price dif-
ferentials among competing buyers where their effect may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition; i.e., when such differentials are not justi-
fied by a need to meet good faith competition, or by properly allocated
savings in the cost of manufacture, sale or distribution. Sections 2 (d)
and 2 (e) 9 are companion sections that prohibit allowances for services
in connection with the resale of goods unless the allowances are propor-
tionally available to all competing purchasers. Section 2 (f) makes it
unlawful for a buyer knowingly to induce or receive a prohibited dis-
crimination in price."
The avowed purpose of section 2 (c)" was to eliminate all possi-
bility of the use of brokerage as a deceptive means of effectuating price
discriminations between competing purchasers for resale." Such dis-
criminations can be effected by paying brokerage to some but not all
competing buyers, or by paying different brokerage fees on sales to
different customers and passing on the savings to the customers, or by
selling to some customers directly at prices which reflect brokerage fees
paid on those sales. However, section 2(c) contains no reference to
discrimination. It requires no proof that, as a result of the payment of
brokerage or a discount in lieu thereof to the other party to- the trans-
action or his agent, others were disadvantaged.
The failure to mention discrimination can be viewed as an un-
fortunate slip of the congressional pen, especially in view of the pleth-
ora of statements in debates and reports that the payment of brokerage
to a large purchaser was a cover for discriminatory pricing. Yet, there
is language in the same reports and debates which indicates that Con-
gress was also concerned with ensuring that only "true" middlemen,
and not buyers or their agents, receive brokerage—regardless of the
existence or absence of ultimate discrimination."
8
 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
9 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1964).
10 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). As the Supreme Court put it:
Congress could very well have felt that sellers would be forced to confine their
discriminatory practices to price differentials, where they could be more readily
detected and where it would be much easier to make accurate comparisons
with any alleged cost savings.
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 68 (1959). The Court further explained that
while § 2(a)'s price discrimination provision is "hedged with qualifications," the brokerage
ban of § 2(c) is "absolute." Id. at 64-65. See also FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co.,
supra note 4; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, supra note 4.
II 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
12 See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., supra note 2, at 168-69. Excellent recent sum-
maries of the background and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act include
Austin, supra note 5, at 4-6; Baum, The Robinson-Patman Act 1-5 (1964); Edwards,
The Price Discrimination Law 1-53 (1959) ; and Rowe, supra note 5, at 3-23.
13 E.g., the House judiciary Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-15 (1936), stressed the fiduciary relationship existing between a principal
and his broker-agent:
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The difference between what Congress declared to be the purpose
of section 2(c) and the actual wording of the statute, coupled with the
obscure language of Broch, has created the present confusion with re-
gard to its enforcement. Is its sole purpose the prevention of discrimi-
nation by subterfuge? Or does its language indicate that Congress also
intended to prevent any abuses of the brokerage function?" The pre-
Brock cases took a position somewhere between these extremes. While
the cases indicate no overt desire to strengthen the middleman's position,
neither do they indicate that the prevention of discrimination was the
sole reason for section 2 (c)'s enforcement. If the Commission chose to
enforce the section where the challenged practice did not result in dis-
crimination, the courts would uphold that decision.15
II. THE OLD CASES
The legislative aims in enacting the brokerage clause were
promptly implemented by a series of decisions that interpreted section
2(c) as a per se statute." Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC'? was the first
The true broker serves either as representative of the seller—to find him
market outlets, or as representative of the buyer—to find him sources of sup-
ply . . . 4But the positions of buyer and seller are by nature adverse, and it is
a contradiction in terms incompatible with his natural function for an inter-
mediary to claim to be rendering services for the seller when he is acting in
fact for or under the control of the buyer. . . .
Congressman Utterback, in House debate, emphasized his feelings that, in view of
the natural antipathy between buyer and seller one cannot serve as agent of the other.
80 Cong. Rec. 9414 (1936). See also Edwards, supra note 12, at 47-48. See Rangen, Inc.
v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. If 71,583 (9th Cir. 1965), in
which, after an analysis of the legislative history of tl 2(c), the court found that Congress
intended the section to proscribe practices other than the discriminatory payment of
brokerage.
14 See Note, Beleagured Brokers: The Evisceration of Section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1308, 1316 (1964).
15
 See Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, supra note 4.
16
 See Edwards, supra note 12, at 71-72, who states that FTC orders involving
brokerage have been almost as numerous as all other orders combined. He states:
The preponderance of brokerage proceedings appears to be due primarily to
the simplicity with which such cases can be investigated and tried. After an
initial burst of litigation concerned almost wholly with efforts by buyers and
their agents to take advantage of the provision in the statute regarding services
rendered, the law, as interpreted by the courts, became enforceable by simple
proceedings. Violation consisted merely in the payment of brokerage or an
equivalent to a party on the other side of a transaction or to his representative.
In proving that a payment was made, that it constituted brokerage, and that
the payer and recipient came from opposite sides of a transaction of sale, the
Commission could establish a conclusive case. There was no need to consider
competitive injury, cost justification, good faith in meeting competitors' prac-
tices, or even the significance of services rendered. Investigation could be short
and inexpensive, evidence could be brief and conclusive, and once the simple
facts were established, no valid defense was available. The Commission had an
incentive to institute brokerage cases, partly because they could provide an
impressive statistical total, and partly because, when an apparent violation came
to its attention, the facts were so readily ascertainable and a proceeding based
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FTC brokerage decision to be reviewed by an appellate court, and the
opinion rendered there set the pattern for subsequent decisions. Biddle
sold market information to wholesalers and distributors in the food busi-
ness for a monthly service fee and also acted as a purchasing agent for
these clients. When it made purchases on behalf of its clients, it col-
lected a brokerage fee from the seller which in some cases exceeded the
service charge it received from its clients. Biddle did not keep the bro-
kerage fees collected from the sellers but credited the amount as an
allowance to the monthly fees due from the buyer-clients. Biddle de-
fended against the FTC complaint chiefly on the ground that it per-
formed a bona fide service for both seller and buyer, and was thus
entitled to a commission from both parties. The court, in upholding the
first brokerage order of the Commission, stated that, in prohibiting pay-
ment of brokerage by a seller to a buyer or his agent or controlled inter-
mediary, "Congress intended to prohibit such payments as an unfair
trade practice."' The court perceived the intent of Congress by point-
ing out that the "evil inherent in the payment of brokerage fees by
the seller to the buyer directly or through an intermediary, is the fact
that this practice makes it possible for the seller to discriminate in price
without seeming to do so."" The court stated that "one of the main ob-
jectives of section 2(c) was to force price discrimination out into the
open . . )120
In Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC,21 a companion case also involving
the sale of market information, Oliver Bros. was held to have received
illegal brokerage from sellers. The court refused to apply the more
strict standard of proof required under section 2(a), the price discrimi-
nation section, nor would it permit Oliver to invoke the "services ren-
dered" clause as a defense. As in the Biddle case, the court held that
the payments made to Oliver were not for services rendered because
they were eventually transmitted to the buyers, and not retained by
Oliver. The court, in commenting on the statutory criteria involved,
stated:
[T]hese practices were forbidden because of their tendency
to lessen competition and create monopoly, without regard to
their effect in a particular case; and there is no reason to read
on them was so simple that there was no need to consider policy questions or
litigating strategy. Moreover, the principal organization of brokers in the food
field was actively interested in vigorous enforcement of the brokerage provision
and probably was zealous in bringing violations of this part of the act to the
attention of the Commission.
17
 Supra note 4.
18 Id. at 691.
10 Id. at 692. (Emphasis added.)
20 Ibid.
21 Supra note 4.
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into the sections forbidding them the limitations contained in
section 2 (a) having relation to price discrimination, which is
an extremely difficult matter to deal with and is condemned as
unfair only in those cases where it has an effect in suppressing
competition or in tending to create monopoly. The forbidding
of specific practices because of their tendency toward a gen-
eral result, also forbidden, is familiar legislative practice; and
no reason suggests itself why the limitations and provisions
relating to one should be read into those relating to the
other.22
The absolute nature of section 2(c), as contrasted with the more
liberal price discrimination provision of section 2(a), was highlighted
by the Great Ml. & Pat. Tea Co. v. FTC case.' Prior to the passage
of the Robinson-Patman amendment, A.&P. regularly obtained from
its suppliers brokerage commissions on its own purchases on the theory
that A.8/1). "field buyers" eliminated the need for the use of brokers by
its suppliers. Following passage of the amendment, A.&P. issued instruc-
tions to its "field buyers" to purchase food products at net prices re-
flecting the customary brokerage when sales were made through
brokers. The effect of this arrangement was to give A.&P. a price con-
cession equivalent to the brokerage commission paid by suppliers to
brokers on sales to other customers. Ala). contended that its field
buying agents furnished the sellers with certain services, such as (1)
submitting market information to sellers, (2) giving advice as to how
the quality of products could be improved, (3) furnishing advice on
packaging, (4) suggesting routing of goods and submitting traffic in-
formation, and (5) helping to eliminate excessive inventories during
periods when there is a glut of commodities.
The court refused to interpret the "services rendered" clause as
an exception to the prohibition expressed in section 2(c). According to
the court, "If the contention of the petitioner be accepted, all the words
employed by Congress in the paragraph after the 'services rendered'
clause become meaningless and unnecessary."" The court showed an
appreciation of the fiduciary relationship between a broker and his
principal and noted that "it is obvious that dual representation by
agents opens a wide field for fraud and oppression." The court added:
The agent cannot serve two masters, simultaneously render-
ing services in an arm's length transaction to both. While the
22 Id. at 767.
29 Supra note 4. Seventeen years after the decision in this case, Congressman Patman
remarked: "[Mile certain big concern had really caused the passage of this act, the
A.&P. Tea Co." Hearings before the House Antitrust Subcommittee on the Judiciary
on Bills to Amend Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
24 Great Atl. Si Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 673.
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phrase, "for services rendered," does not prohibit payment by
the seller to his broker for bona fide brokerage services, it
requires that such service be rendered by the broker to the
person who has engaged him. In short, a buying and selling
service cannot be combined in one person."
While the services rendered to the sellers were actually non-brokerage
services, or at least not the usual brokerage service, the court felt that
they were "incidental" to their duties as the buyer's agent and "for
such incidental services, the petitioner may not be compensated.""
The court also stated that section 2 (c) was a per se statute independ-
ent of section 2(a), and that none of the defenses available in the
latter section could be fused into the brokerage provision. As the court
put it: "To read the words of paragraph (a) into paragraph (c) de-
stroys the Congressional intent."'
In A.&P., as well as in Oliver and Biddle, the brokerage commis-
sions received from the seller inured directly to the buyer. The courts
later dealt with the validity of transactions involving brokerage com-
missions paid to the buyers' agents and retained by the agents.
In 1940 the courts of appeals in Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC28 and
Quality Bakers of America v. FTC29 invalidated brokerage paid to and
retained by the buyers' agents, on the theory that the economic effect
of the payment is the same whether it is retained by the agent or passed
on to the buyer. Webb-Crawford was a wholesale grocery company
which also operated a brokerage house through certain of its officers.
The brokerage house arranged sales to the wholesale grocery company,
for which it received a commission. Quality Bakers was a cooperative
association of bakery companies which collected brokerage from sellers
on purchases made by its members through its facilities. In both cases
it was argued that the brokerage operations were a legitimate service
to the sellers in arranging sales for which compensation should be paid.
In holding that representatives of the buyer cannot receive brokerage
payments even when they render true brokerage services to the seller,
the court severely limited the scope of the statutory language "except
for services rendered." Both courts acknowledged that valuable services
were received from the agents, but stated that to permit payment from
the seller to an agent of the buyer "would largely destroy the statute,
and nullify its plain intent."' The clause was interpreted as simply
25 Id. at 674-75.
26 Id. at 675.
27 Id. at 677.
28 Supra note 4.
29 Supra note 4.
SO Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 270.
827
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
permitting a person to pay his own agent for services rendered. As the
court stated in Quality Bakers of America v. FTC:
It is plain enough that the paragraph, taken as a whole, is
framed to prohibit the payment of brokerage in any guise by
one party to the other, or the other's agent, at the same time
expressly recognizing and saving the right of either party to
pay his own agent for services rendered in connection with
the sale or purchase."
The early cases made no distinction between the types of services
allegedly performed by buyers' agents. It made no difference whether
their services were strictly selling services, or those incidental to selling,
such as furnishing market information or traffic routing to the sellers.
However, the full gambit of services which could be performed without
justifying receipt of brokerage was not revealed until Southgate Broker-
age Co. v. FTC."
Southgate was primarily a distributor of food products engaged in
sales to wholesalers. Approximately sixty per cent of its business con-
sisted of purchasing for its own account and taking title to the goods;
Southgate subsequently resold these goods and received brokerage.
Southgate also acted as a legitimate or pure broker on other trans-
actions. The Commission challenged the legality of the brokerage re-
ceived on those transactions in which Southgate acted as a purchaser
and took title. Southgate wished to offer evidence to the effect that, in
connection with the goods purchased and sold as distributor, it ren-
dered a service consisting of "promoting, offering for sale, selling, order-
ing, receiving, adjusting shortage or damage claims, handling, ware-
housing, distributing, invoicing, collecting, assumption of credit
risks."33
 The Commission had excluded this evidence as irrelevant."
On review, the court stated that the evidence was properly excluded
because such services were rendered by Southgate to itself as a pur-
chaser. The court was cognizant of the fact that Southgate competed
with brokers on sales to wholesalers and therefore received no dis-
criminatory price concession. However, the court answered: " [P] rice
discrimination, which is covered by section 2 (a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 13(a), is not necessary to a violation of section 2(c), quoted above,
which specifically forbids the payment of brokerage by the seller to the
31 Supra note 4, at 398. See also FTC v. Herzog, supra note 4, where the court
invalidated payments to Herzog, a New York City resident buyer representing retailers
located in other states. Herzog received a 5% commission from the sellers and no
compensation from the buyers. The commission was retained by Herzog. Since Herzog
was an agent of the buyers, the payments from the sellers were declared illegal payments
of brokerage.
32
 Supra note 4.
33 Id. at 609.
34
 Southgate Brokerage Co., 39 F.T.C. 166 (1944).
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buyer or the buyer's agent." 85 As a purchaser, Southgate could thus
not justify the receipt of brokerage by rendering services because, in
the court's view, "for sellers to pay purchasers for purchasing, ware-
housing or reselling the goods purchased is to pay them for doing their
own work, and is a mere gratuity."'
The doctrinal formulations resulting from these decisions placed
all commissions received by so-called buying brokers on purchases for
their own account within the express prohibition of section 2(c). 37
Beside the cases discussed, the Commission adhered to and reflected
this position in numerous decisions which were not subject to judicial
review.38 This became settled administrative policy and was not modi-
fied until after the Brock case.
III. THE BROCH CASE
The Brock case is not significant in terms of size, concentration
of power, market share or other traditional antitrust yardsticks. Early
85 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 609. Likewise, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir.
1959) stated:
The fact that the granting of a purported brokerage fee to a buyer may in a
particular case result in discriminatory prices is immaterial. The gist of the
violation under section 2(c) is not that discriminatory prices have been charged,
but that the parties have engaged in a practice designed to deceive others as
to the price charged and paid, whether or not discriminatory.
36 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 611. Accord, In Re Whitney
& Co., supra note 4, at 214 n.6, holding that the commission or brokerage "would not
be bona fide" since "the person who receives such 'commission or brokerage' is buying
for his own account and renders no brokerage service." Similarly, in FTC v. Washington
Fish & Oyster Co., supra note 4, at 597 n.4, the court, in speaking of services of a
promotional nature as an exception to the act, pointed out that "this exception, however,
does not include services of a kind which a buyer normally performs for himself, such
as warehousing and reselling [citing Southgate] or which are of a merely incidental
nature [citing A.&P.1.
37 See Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 189 (1955), which concludes:
As a result, the payment of middleman's commissions to any but pure "brokers"
becomes per se illegal, even though valuable distributive services are performed,
even when no adverse competitive effect results, and even where the challenged
concession reflects actual savings in the seller's distribution costs.
See also Austin, supra note 5, at 115-16; Edwards, supra note 12, at 103-05; Rowe,
supra note 5, at 359.
It should be noted that reference to a "true," "pure" or "legitimate" broker refers
to an agent who performs the services of negotiating the sale or purchase of goods for
and on the account of the seller or buyer as principal, and who is not employed or
compensated by the other party to the transaction. The broker does not own or have
any interests in the products in which he deals. Thus, a broker who purchases goods
for his own account is often referred to as a "buying broker." Actually, a "buying
broker" is simply a purchaser who sometimes acts as a broker.
38 See, e.g., American Nat'l Growers Corp., 55 F.T.C. 3121 (1959); Chinoak Packing
Co., 55 F.T.C. 611 (1958); Ivar Wendt, 55 F.T.C. 44 (1958); W. E. Robinson & Co.,
32 F.T.C. 370 (1941); Haines City Citrus Growers Ass'n, No. 7144, FTC, May 19, 1941;
American Brokerage Co., 31 F.T.C. 1581 (1940); H. M. Ruff & Son, 31 F.T.C. 1573
(1940) ; Albert W. Sisk & Sons, 31 F.T.C. 1543 (1940).
3° FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., supra note 2.
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in the proceedings, one of the principal defenses was that the case was
in the nature of a private controversy, and thereby lacked the requisite
element of public interest required of an FTC proceeding. From the
standpoint of the FTC, it was a case of paramount importance because
it was necessary to establish that section 2(c)'s ban on commissions
by a seller "to the other party" or the intermediary of the other "party"
also imposes a liability on an independent seller's broker. Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision was a complete ratification of the Commis-
sion's assertion of jurisdiction over such a broker, because the majority
and minority opinions agreed that the phrase "any person" in the sec-
tion included a truly independent seller's buyer.4°
The Court dealt with these facts: Henry Broch and Oscar Adler
were co-partners in a brokerage business trading as Henry Broch &
Co. They represented approximately twenty-five seller principals,
negotiating the sale of frozen foods, fruit juices and other food products.
For such services, they were compensated by being paid a commis-
sion or brokerage fee by their seller principals. Among these principals
was Canada Foods, Ltd., a Canadian processor of apple concentrate
and similar products, which was also represented in the United States
by other brokerage firms. Broch's commission on sales for Canada
Foods was established at five per cent during the period in question.
The manufacturer established a price of $1.30 per gallon on its apple
concentrate and authorized its brokers to negotiate sales at that price.
The J. M, Smucker Co. of Orville, Ohio, manufacturers of apple
butter and preserves, was first contacted by another broker represent-
ing Canada Foods in the United States—A. J. Phipps of Tenser &
Phipps, which had been dealing with Smucker for many years on be-
half of other sellers. Smucker did not wish to pay the $1.30 per gallon
price but after some negotiations did notify Phipps that it would
purchase 500 drums at $1.25 per gallon. Phipps wired the offer to his
principal, Canada Foods. The following day Phipps received a tele-
phone call from Koldinsky, manager of Canada Foods, who stated
that the only way the price could be less than $1.30 was by reducing
the brokerage fee. Phipps then telephoned Smucker advising them of
his inability to confirm their offer at the lower price. In a confirming
letter, he stated that the order could be confirmed if he, Phipps, was
willing to cut his commission, but he was afraid that this would be a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.'
40 ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice
Whittaker, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Stewart, dissented. Id. at 177.
41 Henry Broch & Co., 54 F.T.C. 673 (1957). Phipps wrote:
We could confirm the order at the price of $1.25, but we are very much
afraid that we would be right in the way of the Robinson-Patman Act and we
might find our names in print.
It would be a feather in somebody's cap to decorate us with the violation
830
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At about this time, Broch also contacted Smucker in an effort to
sell the apple concentrate on behalf of Canada Foods. Smucker was
still holding to the $1.25 price, and when Broch notified his principal
of the offer, he was also informed that the sale could be made at the
offered price only if brokerage was cut from five per cent to three per
cent. Broch consented and the sale was consummated at the lower
price and the reduced brokerage. 42 Broch continued to collect a five
per cent fee on other sales of Canada Food's goods, but subsequent
sales to Smucker through Broch were at the reduced brokerage and
selling price.
The FTC issued a complaint against Broch, charging it with violat-
ing the brokerage clause. Before the examiner and the Commission,
counsel for Broch argued that section 2(c) was intended to prevent so-
called "dummy" brokerage and that Congress never intended the sec-
tion to apply to "pure" brokers, that is, brokers who represent only the
seller in a transaction and are not connected in any way with the buyer.
Moreover, it was argued that even if section 2(c) did apply, the reduc-
tion of the seller's broker's commissions cannot be considered a pay-
ment or allowance "in lieu of brokerage" to the "other party" in the
transaction by the broker. Finally, the respondent contended that it
was not in the public interest to construe the brokerage clause so as to
inhibit price bargaining, using, as a sole basis, an isolated transaction
involving "a purely private grievance between a respondent and a dis-
gruntled rival.'
The examiner and the Commission concluded that the section out-
laws the diversion of brokerage to buyers "in any manner, directly or
indirectly, from any source."" Further, the Commission stated that
Congress, in enacting section 2 (c), established a policy which "pro-
hibits a broker, acting solely for the seller and not controlled by the
buyer, from passing on, directly or indirectly, to the buyer any part of
his brokerage." 45
 The Commission felt that the two per cent reduc-
tion in brokerage on the Smucker transaction was contemporaneous
and further, we do not believe that you are the kind of folks that would want
to go along with a deal of this kind knowingly.
Frankly, we do not know how to handle the situation. We do hate to lose
the business, but there is nothing that we can put together that will come up
with the right answer and leave us with clean slates, all of which we regret
exceedingly.
Id. at 679.
42 Following the agreement to Smucker through Broch, Phipps wrote Canada Foods:
"We do not know how to talk to you regarding this Smucker deal on the 500 barrels.
We do hope the buyer's position is legal. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits remit-
tance of brokerage to the buyer and they are always looking for some publicity with
larger concerns." Id. at 680.
"" Appeal Brief for Respondent, pp. 7-8, Henry Broch & Co., supra note 41.
44 54 F.T.C. at 673.
46
 Id. at 698.
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with the price reduction by Canada Foods to Smucker and amounted
to a sharing of the price reduction by Broch and Canada Foods. Thus,
the only reasonable inference to be drawn was "that respondent's ac-
ceptance of a reduced brokerage in such circumstances constitutes a
payment of part of their commission to the buyer exactly as though
respondents had paid 2 percent of their commission to the buyer
direct."4° Finally, the Commission dismissed the public interest argu-
ment by pointing out that Sections 2(c), (d) and (e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act do not require any showing of injury to the public in order
to make the act illegal.'"
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Commission, adopting
the arguments advanced by counsel for Broch before the Commission."
The court first stated that "neither the language of § 2(c) nor its legis-
lative history indicates that a seller's broker is covered by § 2 (c).""
The court distinguished the previous FTC cases charging brokers with
section 2(c) violations by pointing out that these cases involved bro-
kers purchasing as agents for buyers, who were receiving brokerage
commissions from sellers which they passed on to their buyer princi-
pals.5° Then the court stated that the Commission had "interested it-
self in a private grievance between rival brokers" and concluded that
there was no public interest in the Commission's injunction against
the seller's broker." The court added that if the Commission's in-
terpretation of section 2(c) was adopted, it would "promote price
rigidity and uniformity contrary to the national antitrust policy."'
If Canada Foods had simply sold direct to Smucker without the
services of Broch, granting Smucker a price concession equivalent to
the usual brokerage fee paid Broch, there would have been no difficulty
in finding a violation under this section. However, Broch's chief de-
fense, adopted by the Seventh Circuit, was that the act did not apply
to reductions in the commissions paid seller's brokers. At this stage
there was no evidence concerning the functional positions of the parties,
discrimination, services rendered by Smucker, or any suggestion of
"dummy" brokerage.
4° Id. at 698-99. The Commission distinguished its holding in Main Fish Co., 53
F.T.C. 88 (1956), where it found that the simultaneous presence of a reduced price and
an eliminated "brokerage" fee could not, in the factual situation there present, generate
a presumption that the lower price reflected an "allowance in lieu of brokerage." There
the Commission had pointed out that the price was not arithmetically commensurate
with brokerage and the factual situation did not warrant a conclusion that brokerage
had passed. The Broth situation, however, presented price reductions commensurate with
brokerage in the context of a clear factual situation. 54 F.T.C. at 699.
47
 Id. at 700.
48
 261 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958).
4° Id. at 728.
5° Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 729.
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Thus, in seeking certiorari before the Supreme Court, the Com-
mission was primarily interested in establishing its jurisdiction over an
independent seller's broker. The petition was granted and, in reversing
the court of appeals, both the majority and minority agreed that a
seller's broker was covered by the language of section 2 (c) "as clearly
such as a buyer's broker."" The Court approved the Commission's tra-
ditional position that, although a reduction in price, coupled with a
reduction in brokerage or other compensation, does not automatically
compel the conclusion in every case that a discount in lieu thereof has
been granted, the question of whether it has been granted depends on
the circumstances of each case." The very fact that the Court found
it pertinent to note that such a coupling does not always compel the
conclusion is itself a revealing though tacit comment upon the strong
inferential power of such coupling, and a recognition that it might itself
be sufficient in the circumstances of some cases.
The Court noted that "the 'savings' in brokerage was passed on
to a single buyer who was not shown in any way to have deserved
favored treatment."55 And, "there is no evidence that the buyer ren-
dered any services to the seller or to the respondent nor that anything
in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by
means of a reduced brokerage charge."" The opinion then suggested
that, since these elements were not present, it was not necessary to
"explore the applicability of § 2 (c) to such circumstances."" Never-
theless, Mr. Justice Douglas explicitly rejected Broch's argument that
the cost justification defense in section 2 (a) could be used to justify a
brokerage discount and would not "fuse" the more flexible price pro-
hibitions with the absolute nature of section 2 (c)."
The dissent, while objecting to the majority's conclusion which
prohibits an independent seller's broker from renegotiating his com-
mission rate with his principal "to effect a sale that would otherwise be
lost to him,"" felt that the majority had left the door open for cases
where a reduction in price based on savings in a seller's brokerage
costs may be legally justified.°° Mr. Justice Whittaker pointed out that
"Section 2 (c) does not expressly require discrimination between pur-
53
 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 163, 170 (1960). Justice Whittaker stated
for the minority that "the phrase 'any person' in § 2(c) includes, of course, even a truly
independent seller's broker." Id. at 179.
54 "This is not to say that every reduction in price, coupled with a reduction in
brokerage, automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance 'in lieu' of brokerage
has been granted." Id. at 175.
55
 Id. at 177 n,19.
58
 Id. at 173.
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 170-72, 176.
59 Id. at 184.
80
 Id. at 189.
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chasers as an element of its proscriptions, nor does it provide any de-
fenses based on legitimate savings in brokerage costs; only § 2 (a) con-
tains such provisions." 81 Thus, the dissent viewed section 2(c) as
absolute in its terms, viewed the "services rendered" clause as only
permitting "payments by a seller or a buyer to his own broker" and
agreed that "neither a party to the transaction nor his intermediary
could perform legitimate services for the other party.""
In sum, both the majority and minority agreed that section 2(c)
was a per se statute, absolute in its terms, and that defenses familiar
in a section 2(a) proceeding, such as cost justification, injury to compe-
tition, services rendered and functional discounts, will not exonerate
the payment of brokerage or an allowance reflecting brokerage.
IV. THE NEW CASES
The wave of appellate decisions, culminating with the Supreme
Court decision in Broch conferring judicial approval upon the FTC's
absolute interpretation of the brokerage clause, was shattered by re-
versals of FTC orders in Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC" and Central
Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC." These reversals seemed es-
pecially significant only because past FTC decisions in brokerage cases
had been approved with monotonous regularity.
Thomasville Chair Company manufactured chairs that were sold
to retailers through commission salesmen. The FTC was concerned
with the pricing utilized which permitted large volume customers a five
per cent reduction from the list price. The Commission found that this
discount reflected, at least in part, a reduction in the salesmen's com-
mission, although the reduction was not arithmetically commensurate
with the discount from the list price: salesmen regularly received a six
per cent commission, but they received only three per cent on sales
to the large volume, favored customers. The list price reductions were
held to constitute discounts in lieu of brokerage in violation of section
2(c)." While the court of appeals agreed with the FTC that the sec-
tion applies to differentials in salesmen's commissions, it injected a
new element into the offense by insisting that discrimination be shown
before a section 2(c) violation could be established. Under the rationale
of Broch, the court felt "that a reduction in price giving effect to re-
duced commissions paid by the seller, are violations of Section 2 (c)
only if such reduction in price is 'discriminatory.' We read that to
mean 'without justification based on actual bona fide differences in the
costs of sales resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
81 Id. at 188.
02 Id. at 181.
306 E.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
64
 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
65
 Thomasville Chair Co., 58 F.T.C. 441 (1961).
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which such commodities are sold or delivered.' "" The court remanded
the case to the Commission for "a full inquiry" as to whether the re-
spondent's custom of paying "a smaller commission" on sales to large
volume accounts "could be legally justified.""
Thus, the Fifth Circuit, contrary to the explicit refusal of the
Supreme Court to do so, "fused" the provisions of sections 2(a) and
2 (c) by making discrimination a prerequisite to a 2 (c) violation and
by importing into the latter the cost justification defense. Tinder the
court's reasoning, it appears that a seller could pass on the savings to
certain buyers where the services of the broker have been eliminated.
This robs the section of all vitality." Subsequently, the Commission
dismissed the complaint, but did "not necessarily agree" with the
"dicta" in the court's opinion. The Commission construed the case as
meaning that in future cases involving the passing on of a "reduction
in brokerage to favored buyers in the form of a discriminatory price
reduction," the Commission would "not rely solely on the fact that the
seller has paid less brokerage on sales at the lower price." It would
also require proof of a causal relationship between the reduced broker-
age fee and the reduced sales price."
In Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 7° the Seventh
Circuit apparently believed that the Commission had relied solely on
the fact that brokers' commissions were eliminated in sales to this co-
operative buying group at price discounts, without establishing the
causal connection between the discounts and the commissions saved.
Central purchased food supplies under private labels for its thirty-five
members. The supplier shipped direct to the member and invoiced
Central, which reinvoiced its members, adding a markup to cover op-
erating costs. At the end of the year, Central paid out of its profits a
patronage dividend to its members. Central officials insisted at FTC
hearings that they had never discussed brokerage during negotiations
with suppliers and the term "brokerage" never appeared on invoices or
other documents. The Commission nevertheless found that the dis-
counts Central received were "in lieu" of brokerage. This conclusion
was based on the "correlation" between the price differentials secured
by Central and the usual rate of brokerage paid by some suppliers. 7'
66
 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, supra note 63, at 595.
EIT Ibid .
Compare Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959),
where the court held that § 2(c) was not violated by a seller who eliminated the services
of a broker entirely, converted to direct selling, and thereafter reduced his prices. See
also In Re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Venus Foods, Inc., 57 F.T.C.
1025 (1960).
4:11)
 Memorandum Accompanying Final Order, Thomasville Chair Co., No. 7273,
FTC, Oct. 22, 1963.
71) Supra note 64.
71 National Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208, 1238 (1962). In cora-
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In addition, the Commission relied on testimony by officials of Central's
suppliers to the effect that the discounts granted Central reflected sav-
ings attributable to elimination of the need for dealing with each mem-
ber-owner individually, and eliminated the work of soliciting and taking
orders." In short, the Commission construed Central's functions as
typical duties of brokers for which they were compensated by dis-
counts equivalent to brokerage fees."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the inference
to the effect that Central received allowances or discounts in lieu of
brokerage "was improperly drawn from comparison of brokerage paid
by such suppliers on sales which they made through brokers, with the
price reductions granted to Central."'" The court stated that Central
was able to buy at favorable prices because of its volume of purchases,
its advance commitments and the savings realized in central billing."
The court was obviously impressed by the fact that Central was a co-
operative undertaking of individual retailers who were attempting to
compete with large chains. As the court put it: "Reason does not per-
mit our ignoring these facts in order to declare illegal a worthy effort
by a number of wholesale grocers, owned by retailers, to reduce the
ultimate sale prices to the consumer, by entering into the arrangement
with Central, which made them stronger in their competition with large
chain stores."'"
Central can be harmonized with previous FTC decisions because
the court based its opinion on the fact that there was no substantial
evidence in the record to support the inference upon which the Com-
mission's finding and order was based. Thomasville, however, cannot
be harmonized with previous decisions disallowing price differentials
based on brokerage savings. But while Thomasville has departed from
precedent by opening the door for cost justification in section 2 (c)
cases, and also by requiring that discrimination be proved, it did not
involve the "services rendered" clause. There were no claims by buyers
that any "brokerage" or "allowance" received was compensation for
services rendered.
menting on the coupling of the brokerage with the price discount, the Commission
stated that the payment of brokerage could be inferred even though the price differential
is not "arithmetically commensurate with the amount of the brokerage." Ibid.
72 Id. at 1237.
73
 Commissioner Elman criticized the Commission's opinion for not recognizing the
importance of cooperative buying groups: "For what it in effect holds is that any price
concessions to a cooperative buying organization—which of necessity performs functions
which a buyers' broker would perform—will be deemed in lieu of brokerage in per se
violation of Section 2(c)." He added: "['The Commission's opinion would most
certainly have the effect of driving these groups out of existence," Id. at 1247.
74 Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 64, at 414.
75 Id. at 414-15.
7a Id. at 415.
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What buyer functions or services will 'justify discounts labelled
as "brokerage"? A consideration of several recent FTC decisions in-
volving wholesalers and distributors of fresh fruit and produce will
supply the answer. The FTC issued cease and desist orders enjoining
three wholesalers" from receiving brokerage, or other compensation,
or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, on purchases for their
own account. At the same time, in Hruby Distrib. Co.," a two-to-one
decision, the Commission exonerated discounts, clearly labeled as "bro-
kerage," received by another wholesaler on the ground that these dis-
counts actually represented functional discounts.
The Commission distinguished the Hruby case on the basis that
Edward Hruby purchased fresh fruit and vegetables from suppliers for
his own account and resold to wholesalers. Unlike the other wholesalers,
Hruby did not sell to retailers but competed with brokers in making
sales to wholesalers." Hruby took title to the foodstuffs, set his own re-
sale prices, and assumed the risks of collection and loss in transit. Half
of his purchases were "drop-shipped" directly to his customers; the re-
mainder was sold from his own warehouse. Many of the discounts
received were referred to by the suppliers and Hruby as "brokerage"; 08
the remaining purchases were made at net prices which reflected the
savings of brokerage payments made on sales by the same producers
through brokers.
Commissioner Elman concluded that the discounts could not be
77
 Garrett-Holmes & Co., No. 7273, FTC, Feb. 26, 1965; Exchange Distrib. Co.,
61 F.T.C. 1 (1962). The FTC also obtained consent orders from the following whole-
salers: Guercio & Son, Inc., No. C-508, FTC, June 20, 1963; Wayne L. Bowman Co.,
No. C-272, FTC, Nov. 29, 1962; M. Degaro Co., 59 F.T.C. 1274 (1961); Yankee
Brokerage Co., 59 F.T.C. 729 (1961).
78 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962). Commissioner Elman wrote the majority decision in
which he was joined by Chairman Dixon. Commissioner Maclntyre dissented, Commis-
sioners Anderson and Higginbotham did not participate.
79
 Hruby testified that he occasionally sells to product departments of grocery chains
on a "fill-in" basis; however, the majority held there was no record evidence as to the
extent of such sales or the prices charged or paid for the goods. Id. at 1446 n.2. The dis-
sent protested that
it is beyond dispute that respondent has as one of his customers a large chain
retail food distributor. The extent to which the favors shown to have been ex-
tended to him as a buyer have been passed on to this large chain food retailer
is undetermined, but it is not necessary to make that determination in this case
in order to hold that the respondent violated Section 2(c) as a buyer.
Id. at 1454.
14:/ The record contains a letter from one supplier advising Hruby that they would
pay the brokerage by check at the end of the transaction instead of deducting it from each
invoice. On many of the invoices brokerage deductions appeared on the face of the in-
voice—in some instances Hruby deducted the brokerage. Id. at 1441. Commissioner Elman
stated that "the characterization" of these allowances as "brokerage . . . or discounts in
lieu of brokerage, reveals nothing more than the not surprising fact that businessmen, in
describing their actions, do not talk like lawyers expert in the niceties of the Robinson..
Patman Act." Id. at 1449.
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considered as brokerage,•even though the parties may have intended
the discounts to reflect brokerage, because the economics of the situa-
tion required Hruby to purchase at a price which would permit him
to compete with brokers in sales to wholesalers. According to the ma-
jority, "such lower prices no matter how labelled, reflects not a saving
of brokerage by the seller (for there is none) but, rather, the difference
in the functional-competitive level at which Hruby and his wholesaler
customers operate."' The majority pointed out that Hruby, unlike
brokers, warehouses, makes deliveries and extends credit. Thus, he
"must be able to offer and sell to wholesalers at a price competitive
with that offered to wholesalers by producers selling through food bro-
kers."' The dissent felt that "it is absurd" to contend that Hruby
renders such services for the benefit of his suppliers who compete with
him. By treating such discounts as functional discounts, Commissioner
Maclntyre concluded that the majority had fused "Section 2 (a) which
permits a price difference to buyers in different noncompetitive func-
tional classes with Section 2(c) which, up to now, did not do so where
the difference in price amounted to a discount in lieu of brokerage
given to a buyer on purchases for his own account!' Finally, the dis-
sent protested that the " 'except for services rendered' proviso in Sec-
tion 2 (c) was never considered as applying to a buyer purchasing for
his own account" in direct conflict with Southgate Brokerage Co. v.
FTC."
The Hruby decision can be regarded as evidence of the Commis-
sion's disposition to be reasonable in determining as a factual matter
when, and under what circumstances, a payment is "brokerage"
81 Ibid.
82 Id. at 1446.
55 Id. at 1455.
84
 Ibid. The dissent noted that counsel for Hruby stated: "We are frank to concede
that in seeking such a ruling, we face the heavy burden of dislodging the long encrusted
authority of Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, supra, upon which the hearing examiner
relied." Id. at 1452. During oral argument, counsel for respondent stated: "The hearing
examiner and Commission counsel say the decision here is absolutely bound by Southgate,
that it is on all fours with Southgate. If Southgate is the Iaw, we don't have a case."
Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 30, Hruby Distrib. Co., No. 8068, FTC, July IO, 1962.
Similar statements were also made throughout the argument. Id. at 14, 64-65. Most com-
mentators also agree that the Hruby decision overrules Southgate. See, e.g., Note, Be-
leagured Brokers: The Evisceration of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 1308, 1323-24; Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 768, 775 (1963).
85 Sometime after the decision, Chairman Dixon, in an explanatory letter to the
President of the National Food Brokers Association, stated "that in deciding matters that
present questions of whether payments are discounts in lieu of brokerage, the Commis-
sion will analyze carefully all of the relevant facts in seeking to determine their true
character. This, it seems to me, is essential, for only by making such analyses in these
cases can the Commission avoid the risk of becoming a victim of the tyranny of 'ambiguous




Similarly, the FTC assumed a rational role in Flotill Prods., Inc." in
ascertaining the actual relationship existing between the seller and the
intermediary, and in validating payments to so-called "field brokers"
who purchased and resold for their own account. The "field broker,"
unlike Hruby, operates from a small office, does no warehousing and
never takes possession of the goods; he is invoiced by his supplier and
is responsible for the payment of the goods; as a rule, he bills his
customer in the same amounts and earns his only profit through the
brokerage commissions. In short, the "field broker" operates in the
same manner as a pure broker, except that he takes what the opinion
referred to as "technical title."87 In these circumstances, the opinion
concluded that the "field brokers" did not purchase for their own ac-
count but functioned as intermediaries on behalf of the seller-canner.
Thus, the opinion was based in part on the fact that ownership of the
goods did not vest absolutely in the "field brokers" as in previous
"buying broker" cases which involved illegal receipt of brokerage. The
opinion indicated that a different conclusion would probably have been
reached "if it were established that a field broker customarily bills
purchasers at a price higher than he pays Flotill" because then he
would be "acting for and on behalf of himself in his dealings with can-
ners." Commissioner Elman agreed with the result but filed a separate
opinion stating that it is "immaterial whether, in what sense, or to
what extent the field broker acquires title to the goods."" He felt that
the "field brokers" perform a useful service to small canners in finding
a market for their goods, and pointed out that the practice results in
no injury. Thus, according to Commissioner Elman,
Section 2 (c) applies only to transactions in which no broker-
age services are actually rendered. Spurious, false, unearned
brokerage is forbidden; but if a businessman performs a valu-
able and substantial service or function in the distribution of
goods, he is entitled to be compensated for it, and Section 2 (c)
does not apply. 89
In both Hruby and Flotill, Commissioner Elman relied heavily on
Brock, which states the legislative purpose behind section 2(c) was to
eliminate "dummy" brokerage and "other means by which brokerage
88 No. 7226, FTC, June 26, 1964 (slip opinion).
87 Id. at 7.
88 Id. at 10.
89 Id. at 5. Commissioner MacIntyre did not agree with the handling of the "field
broker" issue. As he saw it, a canner could sell to a field broker and grant him a
functional discount "as the character of the canner may pay brokerage to the field broker,
issuing his invoices and looking for payment to the wholesalers and retailers who buy
and resell the goods. But the two systems cannot be blended without doing violence to
the law. Also, to permit a buyer to receive brokerage on purchases made for his own
account opens the door to abuse and discrimination."
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could be used to effect price discrimination."°° He emphasized that
"field brokers" like Hruby and Central perform services for which they
are legally entitled to receive compensation. Commissioner Elman felt
that, in Brock the Court indicated that section 2 (c) has no application
in any case where "the buyer rendered any services to the seller or .. .
anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory
price by means of a reduced brokerage charge." 91
It should be noted, however, that in Brock there was no issue con-
cerning any services performed by the buyer, Smucker. The decision
does inform us that Smucker is a manufacturer of apple butter and
preserves, but the record does not indicate the functional positions of
Broch's other customers. 92 Thus, the record is not clear as to the
nature or extent of any discrimination involved. There is no informa-
tion as to the identity of the unfavored purchasers, their method of
doing business or the nature of any injury they may have incurred.
Consider the record in Garrett-Holmes, Inc.," one of the produce
wholesalers charged with receiving brokerage or discounts in lieu
thereof shortly after the Hruby decision. Complainant's counsel pre-
sented clear evidence that Garrett-Holmes received brokerage allowances
on purchases for its own account and that competitors doing business in
the same area, purchasing from the same suppliers, did not receive such
price concessions. The examiner made findings that the brokerage al-
lowances received by Garrett-Holmes resulted in their buying at pref-
erential prices which made it difficult for others to compete in the resale
of the same items.
Garrett-Holmes argued that it performed valuable services for its
suppliers which justified the brokerage or discount obtained and
pointed to the fact that it warehoused the goods, acted as a central
point of redistribution, and bought in large quantities. However, the
Commission, in affirming the initial decision, highlighted the strong
factual situation by quoting from Broch: "There is no evidence that
the buyer rendered any services to the seller { sj . . . nor that anything
in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price as
`brokerage' or discounts in lieu thereof!'
90
 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., supra note 53, at 169.
91 See Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 86, at 7, citing FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,
supra note 53, at 173.
91
 The Commission opinion in Henry Broch & Co. does show some invoice prices
by Canada Foods, Ltd. on sales through its broker, and the names of two of these
customers are mentioned; but there is no information as to the kind of business they
are engaged in, where located, or any other information from which injury could be
inferred. Supra note 41, at 698.
93 No. 8564, FTC, Sept. 29, 1964.
94
 No. 8564, FTC, Feb. 26, 1965. Commissioner Maclntyre concurred in the result
but disagreed with the Commission's use of the controversial passage from Broch, stating
that "the Majority, in holding that the brokerage payments were discriminatory prices
unjustified by services rendered to the seller, applies a Section 2(c) test where it does
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Similarly, the Commission in Western Fruit Growers Sales Co."
invalidated allowances granted to certain buyers of fruit who some-
times acted as brokers, but who, when they purchased for their own
account, resold the goods at a profit. Thus, they took title absolutely as
purchasers and not in a "technical" manner, as the Commission had
characterized the taking of title by field brokers in Flotill. Western
Fruit argued that the brokers were billed "as a matter of convenience"
because they resold to various small purchasers." However, the Ninth
Circuit responded that "motive and intent are immaterial to a violation
of Section 2 (c), if a sale upon which brokerage is paid has in fact been
made!'" According to the court, the only issue was whether a seller-
buyer relationship existed. If one existed, then "a seller may not pay
a buyer brokerage on the latter's purchases for his own account or for
the account of another.""
Shortly after its opinion in Western Fruit, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed a treble damage award in Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson &
Sons," a case brought under section 2 (c) against a competitor who had
bribed a state official in order to make sales to the state. The bribing
seller argued that the payments made to the state official were "for
services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares or merchandise," and that the brokerage provision relates only
to cases involving price discrimination, not commercial bribery. The
court answered that one of Congress' purposes in enacting the section
"was to guard against practices undermining the fiduciary relationship
between buyers and sellers on the one hand, and the agents, representa-
tives, or other intermediaries on the other, in a Section 2 (c) transac-
tion."'" The court did not believe that the services rendered clause
could be used "as a statutory shield to protect illicit conduct which the
subsection as a whole was designed to supress.'"°' The court, noting
that after Brock there was some speculation that the Supreme Court
decision may have imposed a requirement of price discrimination upon
section 2 (c), stated that "although discrimination would appear now to
be relevant in reduced-commission cases, it does not follow that it is
now an essential element in cases involving the outright payment of
unearned brokerage."'
not belong and misinterprets through misapplication the Supreme Court's Broch deci-
sion. . . ."
95 No. 8194, FTC, Sept. 18, 1962, aff'd, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 907 (1964).
96 322 F.2d at 69 n.5.
97 Ibid.
98 Id. at 68.
99 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 71,583 (9th Cir. 1965),
100 Id. at 81,627.
101 Ibid.
102 Id. at 81,626.
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The absolute interpretation of the section was further bolstered
by the Second Circuit opinion in Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American
Viscose Corp.,' reversing a district court finding that discounts given
to two appointed jobbers were functional discounts. The manufacturer,
American Viscose, sells most of its yarn directly to wholesalers, con-
verters, and retailers, but it selected two jobbers to sell and service
customers. These jobbers took title to the yarn, maintained inventory,
assumed all risk, and agreed to resell at the manufacturer's list price. In
return, they were allowed a discount of five per cent from that price.
The court held that the services rendered by the jobbers were actually
a service they rendered to themselves in reselling the yarn and that the
functional discount the jobbers received masked the fact that they were
actually receiving a favored price. The court stated that where the dis-
crimination
is effected by a discount which is related to a sale by the per-
son receiving the discount (i.e. a commission or brokerage or
other similar compensation), Section 2(c) is applicable.
A "functional discount" which is paid, like commissions
and brokerage, in connection with such a sale, may be used to
mask price discrimination in violation of the legislative pur-
pose of Section 2 (c) . 104
Thus, in Hruby, the Commission found that a discount labelled "bro-
kerage" was actually a functional discount and not subject to attack
under section 2 (c) ; 105 in Empire, the court found that a nominal "func-
tional discount" was subject to attack under the same statute.
V. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 2(c)
The best prophet of the future is the past. Since injury to competi-
tion and cost justification are expressly associated with section 2 (a), it
is doubtful that these defenses will be effectively invoked by persons
charged under the brokerage section. It can be anticipated, however,
that persons charged with section 2 (c) violations will contend that the
"services rendered" clause affords a basis for exonerating them from
liability by urging ( I) that payments to the buyer are not necessarily
payments of brokerage or in lieu thereof if the services rendered are
not "brokerage" services; or (2) that the tender which is found to be
brokerage or a payment in lieu thereof is nevertheless justified if the
other party to the transaction or his representative renders brokerage
ioa 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1l 71,632 (2d Cir. 1965).
104 Id, at 81,842.
105
 The dissenting judge insisted that a price discount should not be treated as
"an allowance 'in lieu of brokerage' if it is causally conceived in considerations other than
a saved commission or fee." To support this statement he cited the decisions in Central
and firuby. Id. at 81,844.
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service.'" However, the traditional position is that the services per-
formed by buyers, whether they be clear-cut brokerage services or
incidental to a broker's functions, are not performed primarily for the
sellers' benefit—but rather to promote their own business. For example,
a buyer who redistributes goods, warehouses, extends credit, or in-
spects goods, is doing so because it is in his interest to do so. How can
it seriously be suggested that a buyer or his agent inspects goods pur-
chased as a service for the seller? Obviously, a buyer or his agent in-
spects the goods to make certain the buyer is getting what he ordered.
Any benefits accruing to the seller are incidental and cannot justify
the payment of brokerage.
In the A.&P. case the court found that the services rendered by
A.&P. agents were not the usual brokerage services, but were
incidental to the brokerage function and therefore not compensabIe. 107
Even assuming that A.&P. actually provided brokerage service to its
sellers, to permit it to receive brokerage payment would make section
2(c) even more flexible than section 2(a). Under the latter, a favored
price or discount can be justified under the cost justification proviso
which recognizes only actual cost savings to the manufacturer. It can-
not be assumed that the services provided by A.&P. would necessarily
• save the seller an amount equal to the brokerage.'" Such brokerage
payments can be compared to functional discounts which depend on
many factors having no relationship to cost.'"
If A.&P. were to be permitted to receive "brokerage" payments
for "services rendered" it would undoubtedly receive more value than
it gives. The same is, of course, true with regard to brokers. However,
one distinction is apparent. As a buyer, A.&P. could use the brokerage
fee to competitively injure other purchasers buying through brokers
who retain all of their fee, including any "unearned" portion.
106 See Commissioner Elman's separate opinion in Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 86,
at 5, wherein he states that "Section 2(c) applies only to transactions in which no
brokerage services are actually rendered [by the other party to the transaction or his
agent]."
107 See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
tos Of course, the seller could argue that he is "saving" the brokerage fee since he
would otherwise have to give it to a "true" broker. This is essentially a bootstrap
argument, since the seller chooses to give a brokerage fee to "true" brokers which is,
itself, not based on actual cost savings. Cf. Purolator Prods., Inc., p. 23, No. 7850, FTC,
April 3, 1964 (slip opinion).
too Alhambra Motor Parts, pp. 19-20, No. 6889, FTC, Dec. 17, 1965 (slip opinion).
The Commission and the courts have approved of price differentials quoted by sellers
who classify their customers for pricing purposes according to the distributional function
performed. Thus, a seller may have one price to customers who purchase products for
further processing, another to wholesalers and another to retailers. Although functional
discounts are not mentioned in the Robinson-Patman Act, they therefore are not
expressly permitted. They usually are permitted because they do not result in injury
to competition since the higher price customer does not compete with the lower price
customer.
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The easy answer to this would seem to be that the brokerage fee's
legality should be measured under section 2(a) since it is in reality a
price discrimination. But is it a price discrimination? The argument is
that A.&P. is rendering "brokerage services" in return for "brokerage
payments." As such, the payments come squarely within section 2 (c)
and not section 2 (a). The irony is that the "services rendered" which,
the argument goes, completely justifies the payment of brokerage might
well not be cognizable under the cost justification proviso to section
2(a).
While there may have been some reason to believe that Thomas-
ville' destroyed the precedental value of early cases outlawing price
differentials reflecting eliminated or reduced commissions, recent ap-
pellate decisions disclose a rather surprising reaffirmation of the tradi-
tional approach to the brokerage clause. Both the FTC and the courts
are using section 2(c) to achieve a desirable result. In Flotill't' and
Hruby,112
 the majority could perceive no public benefit or good flowing
from the issuance of an order where the payments labelled as "broker-
age" could not possibly involve any competitive injury."' In Rangen114
and Empire,'" the payment of commissions caused evident injury
which could be rectified by a rigorous interpretation. In his dissent in
Flotill, Commissioner Maclntyre was sympathetic toward the position
of the "field broker," but felt that the seller could either "sell to a field
broker granting him such functional discounts as the character of such
buyer's resale warrants, or the canner may pay brokerage to the field
broker, issuing his invoices and looking for payment to the wholesalers
and retailers who buy and resell goods." He warned that "the two
systems cannot be blended without doing violence to the law.""°
It is not clear whether in future cases the FTC will fasten upon
the absolute language of Rangen and Empire. While the FTC may be
more selective in issuing complaints under section 2(c), it is certain
that its swift and absolute provisions will be utilized when deemed nec-
essary."' Even in such cases, it may well be that complainant's counsel
110 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, supra note 63.
111 Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 86, at 2.
112 Hruby Distrib. Co., supra note 78.
113 The absolute nature of § 2(c) was emphasized in a most detailed interpretation
of the section by the FTC in its Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Industry, 30 Fed. Reg. 5331 (1965). This development indicates that the Commission
intends to limit Hruby and Flotill to their facts, and that a broader interpretation of
these decisions may be unwarranted. See also Bison, The "Services Rendered" in the
Brokerage Section on the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Notre Dame Law. 326-35 (1966).
114 Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, supra note 99.
115 Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., supra note 103.
316 Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 86.
117 See, e.g., ibid., where the Commission invalidated "special promotional allow-
ances" granted to a large buyer because they actually reflected savings in brokerage




will not rely on mechanical invocations of the statute. He will also
present some evidence showing that the practice results in detriment
to the public interest."' The Commission has shown a disposition to
be reasonable in the application of a per se statute, but this attitude
should not be construed as an unwillingness to act when action is re-
quired."'
paring this phase of the case with the "field broker" issue it becomes evident that the
FTC will act decisively in condemning preferential payments based on savings in
brokerage. Moreover, in the same case, the FTC attacked the promotional program
employed by Flotill because it clearly favored certain customers and was not available
to competing customers. Thus, while Flotill is often cited on the "field broker" issue it
should not be overlooked that the company was adjudged in violation of §§ 2(c) and (d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The case is now before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit on a petition by Flotill to review the cease and desist order issued
by the Commission covering brokerage payments as well as advertising allowances.
118
 Ibid. See also Garrett-Holmes, Inc., supra notes 93-94. One commentator has
suggested that complaint counsel should have the burden of proving "that the beneficiary
of brokerage concessions in fact purchased at lower price than other companies in the
same market" even though he rejects "a marriage of the provisions of § 2(a) with those
of § 2(c)." Rill, Brokerage Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Toward a New Certainty,
41 Notre Dame Law. 337, 348, 353 (1966).
110
 In other areas involving enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, the FTC
has also demonstrated a willingness to be flexible in dealing with commercial practices.
See, e.g., Mezines, Cooperative Conditional Advertising Agreements: The Requirement
of Proportionally Equal Terms Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Notre Dame Law.
371, 381 (1966); Rockefeller, The Federal Trade Commission's Potential For Making
Purposeful Antitrust Policy, 24 Fed. B.f. 541 (1964); Statement of Mayer, Chief,
Division of Discriminatory Practices, What's New Robinson-Patman Wise? 27-29 (Aug.
10, 1965).
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